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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to trace the development of the 
French auditing profession, the commissaires aux comptes, focusing 
on the appearance of the large Anglo-American audit firms on the 
French market. The French audit market has always shown a number 
of peculiarities, including the continued importance of a number of 
local audit firms. The French auditing profession finds its roots in late 
19th century company law that introduced an obligation for compa-
nies to release audited financial statements. The profession became 
regulated in its modern form in the 1960s. This paper attempts to 
explain the growing impact of the international audit firms on the 
French auditing profession. It also demonstrates how local profes-
sionals and the French state reacted to these developments.
INTRODUCTION
Most European audit markets have witnessed significant 
changes over recent decades. A striking development that has 
elicited academic curiosity is the growing impact of the large 
Anglo-American audit firms on local audit markets. The develop-
ment of audit markets has been well studied in many venues, 
generally from an economic perspective using contracting 
theory as the framework for the analysis of developments in 
the supply of audit services [e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; 
Craswell et al., 1995; Holmes and Zimmer, 1998]. The existence 
of large accounting firms is partially explained by economies of 
scale. Summarizing the relevant literature, Meuwissen [1999] 
concluded that large audit firms obtain cost advantages and re-
ceive fee premiums, probably due to product differentiation. 
Acknowledgments: The authors thank the CERAG Grenoble for its editing 
support and the referees for their helpful comments.
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Part of this research focuses on audit-market concentration 
as the largest international firms have declined in number from 
the “Big Eight” to the now “Fat Four,” expanding their market 
shares in the process [Pigé, 2003; Ramirez, 2003]. One of the 
first studies in this area was Zeff and Fossum [1967], followed 
by others that also focused on the U.S. Moizer [1992] observed 
how European research lagged behind, that little academic work 
was done in the area of the European audit-services market in 
Europe previous to 1992. 
Eventually audit-market structures were studied in, among 
others, the U.K. [Moizer and Turley, 1987], The Netherlands 
[Buijink and Maijoor, 1991], Denmark [Christiansen and Loft, 
1992], Belgium [Weets and Jegers, 1997], and Sweden [Waller-
stedt, 2001]. On the French market, Piot [2001] highlighted the 
barriers to competition between different categories of audit 
firms (the “Big Six,” large national firms, and local audit firms) 
on the basis of the characteristics of their client portfolios. 
Gonthier-Besacier and Moizer [2001] focused on the current 
perception of audit firms in France and found no significant dif-
ferences between the “Big Five” and large local firms. 
Most of the studies mentioned center on an analysis of em-
pirical data relating to audit clients, fees, or number of profes-
sionals. Our objective, however, is to understand how and why 
the large Anglo-American firms became dominant in France, 
as in most other countries. The issue is worth pondering. Many 
consider France to be a country that vigorously defends its own 
culture, language, and modes of organization. The progressive 
introduction of the international firms means either that the 
French abandoned their traditional positions or that the inter-
national firms adapted to the French culture, language, audit 
approach, etc. These issues are explored in this paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH qUESTIONS
The research question of this paper relates to the entry and 
strategies of the Anglo-American audit firms in France. The 
literature on multinational firms distinguishes different modes 
of foreign entry. Anderson and Gatignon [1986] classified modes 
of entry based on the degree of control afforded the entrant. 
The highest degree of control is characterized by dominant eq-
uity interests, such as majority shareholdings. Medium-control 
modes include joint ventures and contractual arrangements and 
franchises. Low-control modes are typically non-exclusive con-
tracts and minority shareholdings. Chan Kim and Hwang [1992] 
2
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 36 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/4
31De Beelde et al., French Auditing Profession
demonstrate that entry-mode decisions are not only influenced 
by environmental and transaction-specific factors, but also by 
the global strategy of the multinational enterprise involved. 
Agarwal and Ramaswami [1992] consider ownership, location, 
and internalization advantages as factors that have an impact on 
entry-mode choice. To compete with local firms, foreign entrants 
must have superior assets and skills. These depend on firm size 
and the ability to develop differentiated products. The market 
potential and investment risk in the host country have an im-
pact on both the decision to enter and the mode of entry. The 
strength of competition from local firms also influences entry 
strategy [Buckley and Casson, 1998].
The audit industry is a service industry. Much of the litera-
ture on multinational firms focuses on manufacturing enter-
prises and the debate over whether their conventions are ap-
plicable to service industries [Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 1998]. 
Because of the people-intensive nature of services, the entry-
mode choices of service multinationals are more influenced by 
behavioral uncertainties, trust propensity, and asset specificity. 
Similar choices in manufacturing firms depend more on envi-
ronmental uncertainties and risk propensity [Brouthers et al., 
2002; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003]. Sarathy [1994] concluded 
that the internationalization strategies in service industries are 
quite distinctive. They prefer direct modes of entry into foreign 
markets, through foreign investment and acquisitions, often 
with a local partner. High fixed costs and government regula-
tions that favor local firms may deter service businesses from en-
tering smaller markets. In such industries, implementing a uni-
fied strategy across different countries is a significant challenge. 
Bouquet et al. [2004] found that in industries where there is 
close interaction with end customers and where extensive levels 
of professional skills, specialized know-how, and customization 
are involved, there is a preference for wholly owned subsidiaries 
and expatriate staff. In business services such as accountancy, 
internalization and equity-based, foreign direct investment are 
the preferred modes for exploiting ownership advantages [Bod-
dewyn et al., 1986]. These characteristics made it necessary to 
adjust the traditional transaction-cost framework used to study 
entry-mode choice [Erramilli and Rao, 1993]. 
Kipping [1999] studied the expansion of U.S. management-
consulting companies to Western Europe in the 20th century. He 
concludes that the long-term success of consulting companies 
depends on the establishment of successful external (client) and 
internal (partner) networks. The success of U.S. consultancies 
3
De Beelde et al.: Internationalizing the French auditing profession
Published by eGrove, 2009
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200932
was linked with the aura of professionalism of U.S. industry 
and with the expansion of U.S. companies to Europe acting as a 
bridging function.
Previous research on the French accounting and auditing 
profession focuses on the development of associations of ac-
countants in France between 1880 and the 1940s [Bocqueraz, 
2000, 2001] and on the sociology of the accounting profession 
between 1920 and 1939 [Ramirez, 2001]. Ramirez [2003] relates 
the evolution of French auditors since 1970, as well as the role 
of the Anglo-American audit firms. He concludes that the suc-
cess of these firms is due to their integration with the French 
elite and to the lack of adaptation of the traditional professional 
model to changes in the market. 
RESEARCH METHOD
This paper is based on the analysis of a broad series of 
documents and archives, as well as on a series of interviews. 
These documents and archives have rarely been investigated. 
They consist of reports on the meetings of the Conseil Supérieur 
de l’Ordre des Experts-Comptables (CSOEC, National Council of 
the Institute of Public Accountants) from 1960, reports on meet-
ings of the Conseil National de la Compagnie Nationale des Com-
missaires aux Comptes (CNCC, National Council of the National 
Association of Statutory Auditors) from 1970, and the archives 
of the Institut Français des Experts-Comptables (IFEC, French 
Institute of Public Accountants), a major trade union for French 
accountants from 1964. 
The interviews provided information that was not found in 
any other source, as is often the case with oral history. The inter-
viewees were selected on the basis of the role they played during 
the period studied and their functions in the audit profession. 
They include key players from the 1970s and 1980s – former 
presidents and directors of professional bodies, leading partners 
in international and local firms, and members of oversight bod-
ies. The list of those interviewed can be found in Appendix A. All 
interviews took place in June and July 2002, and were attended 
by two of the authors. They were not taped, but extensive notes 
were taken and a report written by one author and checked by 
the other as close as possible to the interview date.
THE FRENCH AUDITING PROFESSION
The traditional audit function in France originated from 
company-law regulations in the third quarter of the 19th cen-
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tury. Although oversight functions on behalf of the shareholders 
existed occasionally before 1863, the law of May 23, 1863 on 
limited companies introduced the statutory audit (the commis-
sariat) in limited-liability companies. Article 15 of the 1863 law 
stated that the general assembly of shareholders had to elect one 
or more commissaires (auditors) who were required to submit 
a report on the situation of the company, its balance sheet, and 
the accounts presented by the directors. The auditor was called 
commissaire des comptes (auditor of the accounts), commissaire 
de surveillance (supervisor), or censeur (censor) [Houpin and 
Bosvieux, 1935, p. 291]. The 1863 law saw the commissaire as a 
company entity, similar to the board of directors, but with the 
task of auditing the books and analyzing the activities of the 
company [Foyer, 1971, p. 195]. As in other countries with simi-
lar systems, this auditing regulation was strongly criticized due 
to the lack of independence and competency regulations [Mikol, 
1993, p. 4]. Shareholders, relatives of directors, or employees 
of the company were all eligible as auditors [Girardet, 1927, p. 
104].
In 1935, the role of the auditor was clarified and his in-
dependence strengthened [Salato and Ghez, 1960, p. 25; Dupuis, 
1967, p. 97; Mikol, 1993, p. 9]. A decree was issued on August 
8, 1935, during an era of financial speculation and parlia- 
mentary corruption [Faure, 1929, p. 13]. It became impossible 
for directors, employees, or their relatives to serve as auditors. 
The provision of non-audit services to audit clients was not 
 allowed; auditors could not receive any fees apart from an audit 
fee. They could only become directors after a five-year cooling-
down period. The auditors had a mandate for three years and 
could not be terminated before the end of term. Other 1935 
innovations included professional secrecy and the obligation 
to  report illegal acts to the legal authorities [Kovarik, 1965]. In 
public companies, the position of auditors was further strength-
ened by introducing the requirement that at least one of them 
had to be chosen from a list of qualified auditors selected by the 
Courts of Appeal after an examination. But the function of com-
missaire was not restricted to specific professionals; most were 
experts-comptables (accountants), conseillers juridiques (legal 
advisers), or well-respected citizens. There was no specific audit-
ing profession1; most of the commissaires had no accounting 
1 Private initiatives to organize accountants include the Compagnie des Ex-
perts-Comptables de Paris, born in 1912. In 1927, the Ministry of Education cre-
ated a state-recognized certificate for accountants [Mikol, 1993, p. 5]. After World 
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background [interview 2]. 
As late as 1967, external auditing was often considered 
ineffective [Chaput, 1990, p. 28]. Eventually, the auditing profes-
sion was comprehensively organized with the August 12, 1969 
decree. This decree included a definition of the objectives of 
an audit and requirements with respect to entry examinations, 
independence, and professional secrecy.2 It led to the creation 
of the Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes 
(CNCC), a national body under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Justice, contrary to the OECCA, the accountants’ professional 
body, which was linked to the Finance Ministry. Before this, 
there existed only regional Compagnies des Commissaires aux 
Comptes in each Court of Appeal district. They assembled in a 
federation, but this federation was not a real professional body 
under the authority and/or control of a ministry [interview 10]. 
One of our interviewees suggested that the creation of the CNCC 
was an attempt to create a more homogeneous body of experts, 
in contrast to the OECCA, whose membership was, by and large, 
considered incapable of performing audits [interview 3]. In fact, 
the OECCA complained that the state did not recognize the eco-
nomic role that its members could play and, at the same time, 
War II, the only profession that was organized on a legal basis was the accounting 
profession for whom an Ordre des Experts Comptables et des Comptables Agréés 
(OECCA) was created in 1942 [Salato and Ghez, 1960, p. 24]. Apart from the 
legally based OECCA, there were many associations for accountants and book-
keepers. (For a discussion of the development of the French accounting profes-
sion between the two World Wars, see Ramirez, 2001.) Although organized in the 
same body, the experts-comptables were opposed to the existing comptables agréés, 
a second-tier profession with little recognition. Interest in auditing was gener-
ally limited. Among the experts-comptables, the most advanced professionals were 
those working for judicial expertises. In fact, “most members of this profession 
were not involved in auditing” [interview 1]. 
2 The reform was prepared following the 1961 and 1962 OECCA congresses. 
The 1961 congress had been dedicated to standards on auditing and the definition 
of auditing, although this word was never used as such [interview 1]. Although 
almost no Anglo-American auditing firms or auditors were active in France at the 
time, the working parties of the OECCA who prepared the reform were strongly 
influenced by the methods and standards of such auditing firms and included a 
partner of Arthur Andersen France [interviews 1 and 2]. At that time, the only 
French firm that had formalized working standards was the Fiduciaire de France, 
possibly also the Fiduciaire de l’Est [interview 2]. One of the consequences of this 
lack of French practice was that the organization of the audit profession was to 
be based on the Anglo-American model. The draft company code of 1966 stressed 
that the auditors should “obtain the competency, independence, and prestige of 
the auditors of the Institutes of Chartered Accountants in the U.K., the mem-
bers of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants or the German 
 Wirtschaftprüfer” [Law Proposal 1003, May 6, 1965, Journal Officiel].
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admitted being troubled by the tendency of the state to interfere 
in its internal problems [National Assembly, meeting on Novem-
ber 22, 1967, Journal Officiel, May 28, 1968, p. 773]. Because a 
significant percentage of the OECCA’s members were at the same 
time commissaire aux comptes [Scheid, 2000; Bocqueraz, 2001], 
it is not surprising to find that it was common for the CNCC 
president to have held leadership positions in the OECCA. The 
OECCA and the bodies representing the commissaires also coop-
erated on a number of occasions.3 
The first presence of the Anglo-American accounting firms 
in France probably should be understood from a transaction-
cost theory perspective [Boddewyn et al., 1986]. By offering ser-
vices in multiple locations, these accounting firms allowed their 
clients to reduce their international transaction costs. In other 
words, the auditors followed their clients. The historical sec-
tions of Anglo-American audit firms’ websites reveal that some 
of them arrived quite early on the French market. At least one 
was already present in Paris before 1914, due to the presence of 
American oil companies [interview 3]. Price Waterhouse estab-
lished its Paris office in 1916. In 1960, it became the firm’s major 
European office, with eight Anglo-American partners. Cooper 
Brothers, through its Belgian office, opened a Paris office in 
1929. Due to the merger with Lybrand, Ross Bros & Montgom-
ery in 1957, the Paris office became the first in the world to 
bear the name “Coopers and Lybrand.” An Arthur Young office 
was established in 1929. Andersen came rather late to France 
in 1952, becoming a full-member firm only by 1970. Until the 
end of the 1960s, it seems that the partners of these Paris offices 
were all Anglo-American; Price Waterhouse, for example, had its 
first two French partners only in 1969.
Although some of them were present early on, their impact 
on the French market was originally rather symbolic. They 
worked only with Anglo-American clients and their offices were 
small. The Price Waterhouse office in Paris, for example, em-
3 For example, the general report presented at the 25th OECCA congress in 
1970 was prepared by a working party consisting of OECCA representatives, the 
Institut Français des Experts Comptables (a major trade union group among ac-
countants), the Institut National des Syndicats et Associations d’Experts Compt-
ables et de Comptables Agréés (a secondary trade union among accountants), the 
Fédération des Associations de Commissaires de Sociétés inscrits (which became, 
in 1970, the Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes and still exists 
today) and the Compagnie des Commissaires de Sociétés Agréés par la Cour d’Appel 
de Paris (which, in 1970, became the Compagnie Régionale des Commissaires aux 
Comptes de Paris, still in existence) [OECCA, 1971, p. 2].
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ployed less than 300 persons in 1975 [interview 1]. They do not 
seem to have been involved in statutory auditing before the end 
of the 1970s. To them, statutory auditing was apparently a legal 
formality, left to French professionals. One former president of 
the OECCA remembers that there were no Anglo-Americans at 
the beginning to assume the role of legal auditor (commissaire 
aux comptes) in French firms, nor were French professionals 
involved in contractual, non- compulsory audits for Anglo-Amer-
ican clients [interview 2]. This resulted in a clear market seg-
mentation up to the 1970s; the international firms were involved 
in contractual audits or consulting services for subsidiaries of 
international companies [interview 3], whereas only French 
firms dealt with statutory auditing, which the Anglo-Americans 
viewed as “complicated, dangerous and difficult to understand” 
as it had a fundamentally legal consonance [interview 3]. 
In 1971, 5,171 commissaires were registered by the CNCC. 
Ninety-one percent of these worked as sole practitioners, and 
87% spent less than half of their time on statutory audits [Ben-
necib, 2002]. Positions were not equally distributed; only 4.5% 
of auditors held at least 50 positions as statutory auditors. 
Eighty-four firms acted as statutory auditor for 80% of all listed 
companies. The vast majority of French professionals were 
sole practitioners who ran their offices in a very “traditional” 
way – no engagement letters, no analysis of internal control 
procedures, no confirmations, no physical inventories, etc.4 One 
of their major weaknesses was their dispersion. This situation 
was further complicated by the heterogeneity of the French 
profession. Not only was it divided between the OECCA and the 
4 quite early on, the accounting profession attempted to educate its members 
in the field of auditing. As early as 1965, the 20th OECCA congress resulted in the 
publication of a textbook, Auditing: Theory and Practice of the Control of Finan-
cial Statements, highlighting the state of the art in auditing financial statements 
[OECCA, 1965]. This textbook was distributed among its members in an attempt 
to improve practice. Contemporary audit methods seem to have been known in 
France in the 1960s and 1970s, even though they were not used by the vast majori-
ty of French practitioners. In fact, even in 1970, the OECCA summed up a number 
of techniques that were not often used in French auditing – evaluation of internal 
controls, establishment of an audit program and extensive working papers, statis-
tical sampling methods, and direct confirmations of account balances [OECCA, 
1971, p. 3]. The professional body also tried to have an impact on education. In 
this area, there were initiatives by the profession and higher education institu-
tions, especially in the area of audit education. Up to 1970, accounting was barely 
taught at universities, but before that year, it was already part of the programs 
offered in vocational schools and in a growing number of Grandes Ecoles business 
schools [Casta and Mikol, 1999]. 
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CNCC, but also within the major bodies, there were tensions be-
tween comptables agréés and experts-comptables [Mikol, 2004, p. 
9]. International audit firms, on the other hand, had aggressive 
growth strategies. They were constantly looking for alliances 
and strategies that could give them a competitive advantage 
[Stevens, 1991]. 
In the 1970s, all of the “Big Eight” international accounting 
firms were present in France [Bennecib, 2002]. Their French 
offices were legal entities according to French law, registered 
with the OECCA. At that time, their majority shareholders were 
either French citizens registered as experts-comptables or com-
missaires aux comptes, or foreign nationals having resident sta-
tus in France with the same professional qualification [Colasse 
and Pavé, 2005]. The arrangements within the international net-
works of firms were diverse. Generally, they were partnerships. 
In some, there was a centralized structure with branches in 
different countries. In others, there was a more federal structure 
where the local firms had exclusive rights to use the brand name 
and where contractual arrangements between the international 
and the national levels included an obligation to train staff ac-
cording to a defined methodology and to collaborate with other 
network firms, as well as potentially receiving sanctions if a local 
firm abandoned the network.
The Aubin report [1982, §64], a major governmental report 
on the status of the profession, summarized the situation at 
the end of the 1970s as follows: “The atomization of practices 
that damages the coherency and quality of their services; the 
increasing power of the Anglo-American practices, supported by 
a clear strategy of market entry and massive resources.” In such 
circumstances, conflicts between the different sectors of the pro-
fession became unavoidable. 
FRANCE AND INTERNATIONALIZATION
Internationalization strategies of companies are strongly 
influenced by institutional factors. Decisions on entry modes 
are influenced by attempts to gain legitimacy from internal and 
external claimants. Yiu and Makino [2002, p. 667] argue that 
“choices of foreign entry mode are significantly influenced by 
isomorphic pressures embedded in foreign national environ-
ments.” Multinational firms face pressure to conform to the 
standards and values of the host country and to the practices 
within the multinational enterprise. Their behavior is influenced 
by regulative, normative, and cognitive aspects of the institu-
9
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tional environment. Institutional distance refers to the extent of 
dissimilarity between host and home institutions [Xu and Shen-
kar, 2002]. A large institutional distance hinders the transfer of 
organizational practice from the parent to the foreign subsidiary. 
This is relevant for this paper as the culture of the international 
audit firms was mainly U.S.-based, which might have made en-
try into France more difficult. 
The attitude of France with respect to U.S. business in-
novations has been analyzed comprehensively by Djelic [1998]. 
This section summarizes some of the key developments that 
she identified. Before World War II, France was a country of 
small companies; large firms were concentrated in only a few 
in dustries, such as mining or iron and steel. French firms were 
typically individual or family-owned. Private limited companies 
and partnerships were far more popular than public companies. 
In France, little trace could be found of the managerial revolu-
tion that changed much of the U.S. industrial structure at the 
same time. In fact, developments in the U.S. were generally met 
with fear and dismay and were considered incompatible with 
the French economic and social order. World War II changed 
this pattern significantly. France emerged from the war as a 
weak and divided nation. Large parts of the population ques-
tioned existing traditions and institutions. A dynamic economic 
system came to be seen as a basis for geopolitical power. The 
examples of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. became attractive for 
their emergence as great powers that relied on innovative and 
growing economies. Following the war, cross-national net-
works were created linking small groups of powerful French 
technocrats and progressive Americans, generally associ-
ated with the Marshall plan. Examples include Jean Monnet, 
Pierre Mendès-France, and the newly founded Ecole Nationale 
d’Administration. They started a modernization process of 
French industry to increase productivity, often with the Ameri-
can economy and U.S. managerial knowledge and methods as 
references.
This context made the introduction and growth of the Anglo- 
American auditing firms in France easier. Our respondents indi-
cated that the Anglo-American firms enjoyed a young, modern, 
dynamic, and competent image. This positive image was felt to 
affect the company managers who hired these firms as auditors. 
They had a good reputation due to their methodological advan-
tage [interview 2]. They were seen as “modern and chic” [inter-
view 3]. This view was confirmed in the professional journals: 
“We also observe a growing fad for Anglo-American techniques” 
10
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[L’Expert-Comptable de Demain, May 1982, p. 18].
The international firms had a stronger financial position 
than French professionals because they were really firms rather 
than loose groupings of professionals [interview 2]. Due to their 
stronger financial position, they were able to take over attrac-
tive clients from retiring French professionals [interview 6]. 
It seems that they also could charge higher fees (the ratio was 
from 1 to 100 compared to a French firm, according to interview 
2, based on a certain kind of “snobbism at a time of prosperity” 
[interview 3]. Contrary to this, one of our respondents indicated 
that the Anglo-Americans “low balled on audit fees to get an in-
troduction to a client, and then made money out of consulting” 
[interview 5]. However, this is difficult to confirm because audit 
and non-audit fees were not disclosed in France until recently. 
Anyway, higher fees would be consistent with the observation 
in the literature that “multinational firms should have supe-
rior assets and skills that can earn economic rents that are high 
enough to counter the higher cost of servicing these markets” 
[Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992, p. 4].
International firms were well-organized, focusing on audit 
methodology and efficient use of staff. Previous research dem-
onstrates that most traditional French commissaires approached 
the verification of financial statements from a narrow, legalistic 
perspective [Ramirez, 2001]. The international firms, on the 
other hand, adopted a more modern and comprehensive ap-
proach. It was well known that there was a large gap between 
French audit practices and those in the Anglo-American and 
Germanic countries [Law Proposal 1003, June 20, 1964, p. 696]. 
The professional competency of the Anglo-American firms was 
undeniable [interviews 5, 6, and 9], and they used tools that the 
French auditors did not have [interview 6]. The only exception 
seems to be the Fiduciaire de France which remained an innova-
tive firm until the 1980s [interview 8]. The international firms 
were perceived to be more serious [interview 2] and provided 
their clients with the presence of numerous assistants, making 
their work visible and valuable. Their files were full of working 
papers, which was not always the case for French firms [inter-
view 6]. From a methodological point of view, they had an edge 
over most French professionals [interviews 2 and 3] and guar-
anteed the quality of a homogeneous service [interview 3]. The 
Anglo-American firms demonstrated their methodology also to a 
broader audience.
The increasing internationalization of French companies 
from the 1980s onwards further strengthened the position of 
11
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the Anglo-American audit firms.5 French audit firms apparently 
could not offer overseas services to the same extent, and their 
names were not recognized abroad [Casta and Mikol, 1999, p. 
114]. Although some French firms tried to establish networks 
of correspondents (e.g., Salustro and DFK in 1966), the Anglo-
American networks proved much stronger because they were 
more integrated and had existed for a longer time [interview 2]. 
French firms definitely suffered from a competitive disadvantage 
because the major positions, e.g., in the U.S. market, were al-
ready taken by home-based firms there [interview 3]. Using the 
signature of international audit firms allowed French companies 
to gain recognition abroad [interviews 6 and 7]. 
The international firms also offered a broader range of 
services. In France, the market for non-audit services was 
completely open. During the 1970s and 1980s, the local audit 
firms had “nothing else to sell but accounting or taxation con-
sultancy,” with the exception of Fiduciaire de France, which also 
offered legal expertise. International firms systematically sold a 
broad range of services [interview 6], including computer ser-
vices (a key area for Arthur Andersen according to interview 3), 
tax consulting, recruitment consultancy, corporate finance, and 
environmental consulting. Their competence was overwhelming 
in the field of “real consulting, that is, one that leads to setting 
procedures and information systems,” and which allows the sale 
of thousands of hours of services [interview 5]. Often they got a 
foothold in companies by offering tax services, especially those 
related to international tax issues, and then extended their in-
volvement [interview 7]. The timing of their large-scale introduc-
tion to the French market coincided with the prevalence of huge 
opportunities in this area. They also provided specialist services, 
such as consolidation. French professionals were unfamiliar 
with group accounts. The term “consolidation” does not appear 
in the 1957 Chart of Accounts (Plan Comptable), neither does it 
appear in accounting teaching curricula nor in the July 24, 1966 
law on commercial firms [Casta and Mikol, 1999]. Although the 
first consolidated statements predate 1968, the practice was not 
widespread, and reports were prepared without legal or profes-
sional rules [OECCA, 1971, pp. 133-159]. The Anglo-American 
firms immediately dominated this part of the market; large 
groups, such as Saint Gobain, depended strongly on interna-
tional audit firms, in part because their consolidated statements 
5 Of the capital of French companies listed on the Paris Stock Exchange, 
37.5% was owned by foreign investors as of 2000 [Le Monde, 2001, p. 22].
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generally adopted American accounting standards. Consolidated 
financial statement regulations were eventually introduced into 
the French law in 1985 [Touron, 2003].
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE INTERNATIONAL AUDIT FIRMS
The Reaction of the French Public Authorities: In 1982, Min-
ister of Finance Jacques Delors commissioned Finance Inspec-
tor Christian Aubin [1982] to conduct an investigation into the 
accounting profession. According to one of our interviewees 
who personally participated in its elaboration, this study was 
mandated by the profession itself [interview 3]. It suggested the 
easing of regulation on the provision of non-audit services and 
the creation of a new body of larger audit firms that would be 
internationally recognized. The position of the French govern-
ment was also expressed during the parliamentary debate: “The 
objective of the government … is to facilitate the development of 
French firms that have a professional level and a size that allows 
them to offer quality services which are comparable to those of 
their international competitors” [Senate Debates, November 20, 
1982, Journal Officiel, p. 5,624]. 
The Aubin report was followed by an initiative by the min-
ister of finance, approved by the minister of justice, who asked 
Inspector General of Finance Philippe Huet to propose mea-
sures to strengthen the audit profession in France and to help it 
in its international development. However, Mr. Huet concluded 
in 1984, that it was only through joining worldwide audit firms 
that French auditors would have their professional quality rec-
ognized internationally. Starting with such associations, French 
firms could become famous and then continue on their own 
[Aujourd’hui et Demain, No. 28, June 20, 1984]. 
All these reports suggest that the position of the French 
State was to conclude that mergers within the accounting pro-
fession were unavoidable. Smaller firms apparently saw this 
as an attempt to stimulate the creation of large audit firms, to 
the detriment of small firms and sole practitioners, and blamed 
the state for helping the Anglo-American firms. One of our re-
spondents averred that the state has “done nothing to help the 
French profession” and even “has an absolute responsibility” 
for weakening the position of French professionals [interview 
3]. The same message was communicated in the editorial of 
L’Expert-Comptable de Demain [July 1983, p. 3]: “Mr Aubin con-
cluded that, faced with competition and in order to be able to 
invest in research, our profession is bound to merge … M. Aubin 
13
De Beelde et al.: Internationalizing the French auditing profession
Published by eGrove, 2009
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200942
seems to think that great size is the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for making a professional firm credible. This is not our 
opinion.” This mistrust of the role of the state was already pres-
ent among practitioners in the 1970s. As an example, Jacques 
Secher said at the general meeting of the IFEC on November 4, 
1972: ‘The main enemy are the Public Authorities and a number 
of technocrats who want to abolish the professions, the medical 
doctors, the barristers’ [cited in IFEC Informations Mensuelles, 
November 1972, p. 31]. To some extent, this type of reaction re-
flected a development that goes beyond the world of accounting. 
It represents a transformation from a profession focusing on 
its institutional role to one in which business interests became 
much more significant. During this period, French notaries, 
architects, and doctors, confronted with similar changes, ques-
tioned their professional organizations. 
The Role of the Commission des Opérations de Bourse: The Com-
mission des Opérations de Bourse (COB)6 was created in 1967 
to supervise the French capital market. It could have had a sig-
nificant impact on the introduction of these international audit 
firms since it ratified the appointment and renewal of statutory 
auditors in listed companies. Although the COB did not have 
any decision-making power, companies often asked its opinion 
when audit mandates had to be renewed. Evidence with respect 
to the role of the COB is contradictory. Generally, it increased 
the demand for competent and independent auditors [interview 
1]. Some of our respondents suggested that the COB had a list 
of auditors that it recommended to companies desiring a list-
ing [interviews 2 and 4]. This view was rejected by the former 
head of accounting policy at the COB [interview 7]. For some, 
the COB apparently preferred the French audit firms because 
its contacts with such firms were easier and because it had 
more impact on them [interview 2]. However, other respondents 
stated the opposite, suggesting that the COB preferred the An-
glo-American firms because they were more fashionable, more 
competent, and/or more dynamic [interviews 3, 5, and 6]. Other 
respondents said that the COB was not very concerned [inter-
view 9] or that its position varied depending on the preferences 
of its president [interview 4]. On balance, the COB on this issue 
appears to have favored larger audit firms. It confirmed that the 
certification of financial statements should be based on an audit 
6 The COB is currently known as the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (Finan-
cial Markets Authority).
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(une révision comptable) by commissaires with a team of assis-
tants, carried out during the accounting period, and supported 
by a permanent file, including an analysis of the internal control 
system [Meary and Salustro, 1971, pp. 176-177]. This position 
went contrary to the approach of the traditional French commis-
saire, who often worked individually [Ramirez, 2003]. There is 
no factual evidence of a clear position taken by the COB. During 
our interview, the former COB executive showed that French 
audit firms audited 45% of the medium-sized firms listed on 
the Second Market, created in 1987, and all of the companies 
listed on the New Market, created for high-tech firms in 1997. In 
conclusion, it is unclear which firms were favored by the COB, 
and whether there was any systematic pattern in its preferences. 
Its role should not be overestimated, in any case, because the 
French stock market was only of secondary importance and 
many large French companies were state-owned. 
In the 1980s, the big Anglo-American firms came to domi-
nate the whole of the French audit market, as shown in Table 
1. Among 591 audit firms employing more than 20 persons in 
France in 1983, only ten had more than 200 employees, rep-
resenting one-third of the profession in terms of personnel. 
Just nine of them audited 48.3% of French listed companies. A 
decade later, audit firms with more than 50 staff employed only 
1.3% of French auditors and accountants, but earned more than 
29% of the total revenue of the profession in 1997 [Béthoux, 
2001]. A number of local firms continued to audit listed com-
panies, although the vast majority of companies on the stock 
exchange were audited by international firms.
TABLE 1
French Audit Market in 1983 
Panel A: Turnover of French Audit Firms in 1983,  
French Francs, (000s omitted)
Rank Audit Firm International Network KF
1 Helios Streco Durando Arthur Young 186,000 
2 Guy barbier et associés Arthur Andersen 115,000
3 De Bois Dieterlé et associés Touch Ross  95,700
4 Gufflet et Cie Coopers et Lybrand  90,000
5 Blanchard Chauveau et associés Price Waterhouse  85,000
6 Audit continental Peat Marwick Mitchell  73,000
7 Befec B.D.O.  72,000
8 Frinault Fiduciaire K.M.G.  69,800
9 SEEC Reydel Blanchot Dunwoody Robson  58,000
10 Cabinet Mazars N/A  52,000 
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Panel B: Audit Firms with the Highest Number  
of Listed Clients
Rank  Audit Firm International Network Number 
of Listed 
Clients 
 1 Befec B.D.O. 155
 2 Frinault Fiduciaire K.M.G. 121
 3 De Bois Dieterlé et associés Touch Ross 108
 4 Helios Streco Durando Arthur Young 100
 5 SEEC Reydel Blanchot Dunwoody Robson 58
 6 Calan Ramolino DHR International 53
 7 Castel Jacquet N/A 50
 8 Fiduciaire de France KMG 51
 9 Pavie et associés N/A 51
 10 Cauvin Angleys St Pierre Howard et Howard 39
Source: ATH, 1985
OPPOSITION AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL FIRMS
The Cultural Reaction: Following World War II, not everyone 
in France was convinced of the need to modernize the French 
economy. Part of the French business community has always 
continued to defend its traditional positions against the modern-
izers [Djelic, 1998, p. 237]. French business associations were 
divided with many of its members suspicious of the moderniza-
tion project. Especially in smaller companies, there remained 
strong support for traditional family capitalism in the 1950s. 
This conservatism limited the potential growth of the Anglo-
American audit firms in France. In general, multinational corpo-
rations are hindered in their expansion if there are significant le-
gal or cultural differences between home and the target country 
[Xu and Shenkar, 2002]. The differences between France and the 
Anglo-American countries, home to the large accounting firms, 
were quite significant [Nobes and Parker, 2000]. 
A legalistic tradition is a major component of French soci-
ety, leading to a “highly regulated position of statutory auditors” 
[Piot, 2001, p. 463]. Specific French attributes, such as the strict 
regulation of independence and requirements in corporate law 
to issue specific reports to third parties, may have produced a 
significant barrier to the entry of Anglo-American firms into the 
auditing market. Another significant issue is the role of French 
culture and its impact on the business community. Antinomies 
between French and the Anglo-American cultural models made 
the Anglo-American model ill-adapted to French behaviors 
[d’Iribarne, 1985]. Traditional preferences for “French products” 
16
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 36 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/4
45De Beelde et al., French Auditing Profession
also helped the French accounting firms, especially in small 
companies (culture franchouillarde or “Frenchy culture”), as 
one of our respondents put it [interview 2]. Those who resisted 
the introduction of Anglo-American firms strengthened this 
protectionist cultural attitude. Those cultural and regulatory 
barriers appear to have been quite strong. As indicated before, 
the Anglo-American firms originally established themselves with 
non-French partners, illustrating the American preference for 
majority ownership in foreign subsidiaries [Erramilli, 1995, p. 
228]. It is probably also linked with their limited target market 
(subsidiaries of foreign companies) and with the relatively small 
number of French professionals who could meet their standards 
in these early years. To overcome the limitations that this policy 
placed upon their growth potential, their strategy adapted to 
French culture and regulation and the international firms be-
came rapidly “francisized.” They began to hire French profes-
sionals and promote them to the partner level; “they adapted 
marvelously to the French environment by hiring French profes-
sionals very rapidly” [interview 5]. More generally speaking, it 
suggests that these firms gradually adopted a strategy of licens-
ing or franchising once a sufficient number of knowledgeable 
professionals was present in the French market [Boddewyn et 
al., 1986].
The Reaction of French Professional Bodies: As with other in-
dustry associations, the professional accounting bodies defended 
the interests of French professionals. The accounting activities 
of foreigners were strictly regulated. Based on a September 1945 
regulation, foreign professionals could be allowed to provide 
accounting services in France. However, their number remained 
quite limited.7 Our interviews suggest that official representa-
tives of the profession often were against the development of 
the large Anglo-American firms in the early 1970s [interview 2]. 
7 Some examples show these low numbers. Fifty-eight Swiss professionals and 
ten professionals labeled as “refugees” joined the profession in 1959. The “refu-
gees” probably came from former French colonies; they definitely were not Anglo-
American [Actes du CSOEC, February 10, 1960]. In 1960, 60 Swiss and 11 “refu-
gees” [Actes du CSOEC, February 6, 1961] and in 1961, 60 Swiss, 17 “refugees,”and 
4 professionals from Morocco were accepted as members [Actes du CSOEC, Feb-
ruary 14, 1962]. In 1971, some U.K. professionals were accepted by the OECCA, 
but the following year, another candidate was rejected. The report on the meeting 
of the OECCA board that discussed the rejected candidate’s application mentions 
intense discussions on the subject of “tolerated professionals,”presumably refer-
ring to the Anglo-American accounting firms.
17
De Beelde et al.: Internationalizing the French auditing profession
Published by eGrove, 2009
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200946
This opposition was not only a nationalist reaction, it was also a 
reflection of what perhaps could be labeled as a more traditional 
view of the accounting profession. Jean Sigaut, president of the 
CNCC between 1975 and 1979, for example, considered both the 
Anglo-American firms and large French firms, such as the Fidu-
ciaire de France and La Villeguérin (a multiservice firm), to be 
breaking professional rules with respect to combining statutory 
audits and advisory services. 
A number of measures were taken that made it more dif-
ficult for the Anglo-American firms to grow. Auditors could only 
practice as commissaire under a French name. This was a seri-
ous handicap for the international firms since the use of their 
international trademarks would have given them a significant 
ownership advantage over lesser-known competitors [Boddewyn 
et al., 1986, p. 50]. Some of them, such as Arthur Andersen, 
tried to register under French names. Others were registered 
as “foreigners” and prevented from conducting statutory audits 
[interview 3]. A second measure that acted in fact as a barrier 
to Anglo-American firms was a ban on publicity. In 1984, adver-
tising was allowed for audit firms in the U.K. [La Profession 
Comptable, November 1984], leading to a multitude of adver-
tisements in such newspapers as The Financial Times. It was 
followed by debates in France because the liberal U.K. policy 
created distortions in the market as the continental branches 
of the international audit firms obviously profited from those 
campaigns.8 Third, the regulation on accepting trainees stated 
that one could spend only one year of the three years of trainee-
ship in a foreign firm to become qualified for membership in 
professional organizations [Aubin, 1982, §111]. One of the con-
sequences of this limitation was that a number of professionals 
from the Anglo-American firms moved to large French firms. 
One of our respondents cited the case of approximately ten 
promising, young auditors who left Peat Marwick, were hired by 
Mazars for their training period, and remained there afterwards 
[interview 1].
The limitations on combining different types of services 
were supposed to prove more cumbersome to the Anglo-Amer-
ican firms. As a consequence of disciplinary actions, these 
firms created separate entities for each of their activities. Peat 
Marwick, for example, created PMM France (consultancy), Audit 
Continental (accounting), Agence Juridique et Fiscale (law), and 
SCP Claude Briollay (auditing) [Aubin, 1982, §113.] However, the 
8 Advertising for audit firms was only allowed in France in 2005.
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French State, had it really wanted to, could have done more to 
limit the expansion of the international audit firms. It did not 
prosecute the international firms for violating conflict-of-interest 
regulations, probably because the CNCC never initiated legal 
actions on these issues. Jean Sigaut, president of the CNCC, 
declared at the general meeting of the Compagnie Régionale des 
Commissaires aux Comptes de Paris on July 10, 1979, that the 
CNCC did not want to take action because that would have pub-
licized the problems of the profession and would have damaged 
the whole of the profession. Another reason was probably that 
the Anglo-American firms were not alone in offering multiple 
services. Large French firms such as Fiduciaire de France and 
La Villeguérin did the same [IFEC Archive, IFEC General Meet-
ing, October 23, 1971], and many sole practitioners also offered 
different types of consulting to their auditing clients [CNCC 
Archive, CNCC National Council, July 10, 1972; CNCC Archive, 
General Meeting of the Compagnie Régionale des Commissaires 
aux Comptes de Paris, July 10, 1979]. If the profession had gone 
against the international firms, it would have to take action also 
against local practitioners.
It seems that the professional bodies were stuck between 
their traditional defense of the French profession and the need 
for stronger auditing firms. René Ricol, at that time president 
of the CNCC, confirmed in 1987 that the first objective of the 
CNCC was to support the development of French audit firms 
capable of providing services to French clients abroad [La Pro-
fession Comptable, No. 54, June 1987]. The second objective was 
to provide a French identity to international firms with French 
branches that would be as independent as possible from inter-
national networks. Ricol [as cited in La Profession Comptable, 
No. 54, June 1987] analyzed the situation as follows:
... I am referring to the clear evolution of some major 
international networks towards a federative structure, 
in which strong national firms regain their indepen-
dence. I continue to hope to see one or two French 
audit firms capable of creating a smaller, less ambi-
tious network that would be entirely at the service of 
France. ... The real debate nowadays is for the medium 
and smallsized firms who have to devise their strategy. 
This choice is either a local client base, the voluntary 
decision to join a federation, or a restructuring of audit 
firms. 
The Reaction of French Professional Associations: Professional 
associations also reacted to the developments but were divided 
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on the issue. Some, such as the Experts-Comptables de France 
(ECF), defended the small firms; others, such as the IFEC, 
favored international firms [interview 4]. An interesting initia-
tive was the creation of the AFDA, the Association Française 
pour le Développement de l’Audit (French Association for the 
Development of Auditing). According to Le Nouvel Economiste 
of February 15, 1982, the AFDA was a lobbying instrument, 
set up by the public authorities after the election of François 
Mitterand as president of France in May 1981 and the OECCA, 
in order to support the large French accounting firms in their 
negotiations with the French administration and those respon-
sible for the management of the public sector. The AFDA was 
supposedly introduced to stimulate the election of large French 
firms as commissaire aux comptes to the detriment of the large 
Anglo-American firms and the smaller French auditors [L’Expert-
Comptable de Demain, May 3, 1982]. The creation of the AFDA 
led to diverging reactions from the profession. It was immedi-
ately criticized by a significant number of sole practitioners who 
considered the AFDA to be an initiative to conquer their tradi-
tional market: “I have written that the AFDA is a scandal and I 
have said it openly: the AFDA is a group of people who reserve 
the business for each other” [Franc Parler, No. 33, 4th quarter, 
1984, quoting J. Sigaut]. Others said that it “became a closed 
group with a corporatist attitude whereas it should be an instru-
ment to promote quality” [Franc Parler, No. 18, 2nd quarter, 
1982, quoting J. Caudron], and that it was created to “reserve 
part of the accounting market for a limited number of audit 
firms” [L’Expert-Comptable de Demain, June 6-7, 1982, quoting 
Maranchon]. However, the AFDA also had its supporters within 
the profession because it could help maintain the presence of 
French firms as auditors for large clients [L’Expert-Comptable de 
Demain, June 6-7, 1982; Aujourd’hui et Demain, No. 7, June 15, 
1982]. Guy Cosson summarized the strategic role of the AFDA 
as follows: “The AFDA is not only a battle machine between the 
large French firms against the large Anglo-American firms, for 
the large auditing assignments; it will also (I do not dare to say 
mainly) be a tool to speed up the concentration of engagements 
for the large firms” [L’Expert-Comptable de Demain, October 
1982]. In conclusion, the AFDA was created with the support of 
a few large firms to put into place a structure capable of fighting 
the Anglo-American firms by co-opting their very own methods, 
such as high-quality services, a large and competent staff, and 
systematic quality control. Its creation in fact confirmed that 
the Anglo-American accounting firms were considered to have 
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su perior assets and skills that allowed them to compete success-
fully with local competitors [Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992]. 
Their superiority apparently was considered such that mimick-
ing them seemed to have become the only viable alternative for 
part of the French profession and the state.
The Importance of French Legal Joint-Audit: The co-commissariat 
was another support for the traditional profession. To strength-
en the protection of public savings, the August 8, 1935 decree 
had forced listed companies to select at least one of their com-
missaires from a list maintained by the Courts of Appeal. These 
auditors were selected on the basis of an examination of their 
technical competency. Thirty years later, the law of July 24, 1966 
maintained the obligation to have two commissaires in listed 
companies and in private limited-liability companies possessing 
a capital of more than five million francs. However, all commis-
saires had to meet the same minimum quality standards from 
1966, and the introduction of the Eighth European Directive in 
1984 further harmonized the level of professional competency. 
This means that the original obligation to have two auditors, 
one of them having a guaranteed professional competency, 
became meaningless. The existing regulation was criticized by 
the COB, the financial market regulating body: “The unity of the 
audit methodology and of professional responsibility … seems 
incompatible with collegiality” [National Assembly, Report 1526, 
May 26, 1983, quoting Jacques Roger-Machart]. Industry, rep-
resented by its Paris lobbying body, the Chambre de Commerce 
et d’Industrie de Paris, also criticized the regulation: “... the only 
consequence of the obligation for certain companies to employ 
two commissaires is that they have to pay additional fees” [CNCC 
Archive, CCIP press release, April 2, 1971]. The CNCC continued 
to support the co-commissariat: “... facing directors who – in 
this type of companies – are often eminent personalities, the 
presence of two commissaires who support each other increases 
significantly the importance given to their opinions and their 
capacity to resist pressure from the directors” [CNCC Archive, 
Jean Sigaut, in a letter to the director of the exchequer, March 
10, 1976]. Other advantages, according to CNCC officials, were 
that young professionals could audit large companies with the 
help of experienced commissaires and that the system generated 
additional fees [CNCC Archive, letter from Roger Caumeil, presi-
dent of CNCC, to Representative Roger-Machart, June 30, 1983]. 
Caumeil believed that the suppression of the co-commissariat 
would lead to the replacement of French auditors by Anglo-
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American firms [CNCC Archive, letter from Roger Caumeil to 
Robert Badinter, minister of justice, January 17, 1984]:
Now that we introduced the obligation to have the 
consolidated financial statements audited, suppress-
ing the co-commissariat would lead the large compa-
nies (that have international financial operations and 
consequently need the signature of an international 
audit firm), to keeping only the French branch of in-
ternational firms as their auditor. Consequently, many 
French commissaires would be eliminated and the larg-
est companies would be audited by international firms. 
The co- commissariat allowed the French auditors to 
maintain their position up to now and even to increase 
their market share in auditing. 
Eventually, the discussions during the first half of the 1980s 
maintained the co-commissariat, even though the law of March 
1, 1984 focused its application on companies that published 
consolidated financial statements. In conclusion, the co-com-
missariat was seen as a way to oppose the dominance of the 
Anglo-American firms and to defend the interests of the auditors 
in large companies. Eventually, also, the co-commissariat would 
not be able to prevent the growing impact of the international 
audit firms, which extended their impact on listed and other 
large companies through mergers in the early 1990s.
GROWTH STRATEGIES OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL AUDIT FIRMS
The Anglo-American firms in France followed different 
growth strategies. The majority experienced internal growth 
coupled with the takeover of local firms, a more efficient and 
less costly strategy than creating new offices [interview 9]. Merg-
ers with local French firms were seen as a way of overcoming 
French resistance against an Anglo-American takeover [Gonthi-
er-Besacier and Moizer, 2001].
One example is Arthur Andersen. It began its activities 
in France by following clients with activities in Europe. In 
December 1970, the firm abandoned its international name to 
become Guy Barbier, adhering to a regulation of the OECCA that 
required the use of a French name. In its early years, the firm 
did not take over French accounting firms, adopting an inter-
nal growth strategy. “Local fees,” or local clients, progressively 
became just as important as “referred fees,” local subsidiaries 
of foreign firms that had to have the same auditor as the parent 
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company abroad. Around 1980, the firm expanded its client base 
to smaller companies and eventually acquired GPA (Peyronnet 
Gauthier) while maintaining this company strictly separate from 
its other activities. The objective of this acquisition was primar-
ily to obtain a number of large French clients, but a group of 
middle-sized clients also came on board [the Andersen story 
as told by interviewee 7]. Guy Barbier also acquired Frinault 
in 1987, after the former partners of that firm decided to leave 
KMG (now KPMG). Other firms adopting similar strategies were 
Price Waterhouse (merging with BEFEC in 1989) and Deloitte 
(merging with Calan Ramolino in 1997).
With respect to their establishment outside Paris, different 
strategies could be observed. Some firms, such as Arthur Ander-
sen, remained focused on Paris for a long time as the presence 
of Guy Barbier outside of Paris remained limited to Lyon. Most 
other firms developed from a single Paris office only to an ex-
panded presence throughout the country. Expansion was carried 
out through associations with local firms as this approach was 
seen as a more effective, less expensive growth strategy than the 
creation of new offices. 
A totally different strategy is exemplified by KPMG, growing 
from a local firm into an international one. The origin of KPMG 
France is Fiduciaire de France, created in Grenoble in 1922. 
Originally, it was a legal and tax-services firm that extended its 
activities to accounting only later, mainly due to the develop-
ment of fiscal regulations. In 1945, the Fiduciaire de France 
had established its activities all over France and split into two 
different entities, the Société d’Expertise et de Commissariat aux 
Comptes Fiduciaire de France and the Fiduciaire Juridique et Fis-
cale de France. In 1970, it started to look for foreign partners as 
a consequence of the fact that its clients internationalized. The 
firm then had auditing standards, a research department and 
a methodology department, its own professional training or-
ganization, and a modern technology orientation. At that time, 
most of its auditing activities were contractual, not leading to an 
externally published opinion on financial statements. In 1979, 
it joined KMG, a federation of the American firm Main, at that 
time the ninth largest U.S. accounting firm, and the largest na-
tional accounting firms in The Netherlands, Germany, the U.K., 
and France. It was located in Amsterdam. In 1980, it took over 
Frinault Fiduciaire, a firm that had prestigious French clients. 
The KMG methodology was subsequently transferred to Frinault 
Fiduciaire. KMG remained a federation, meaning that there was 
a common brand, development strategy, and quality control sys-
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tem, but also that local identity was respected and profits were 
not shared on an international level. KPMG was created in 1986, 
merging KMG and Peat Marwick Mitchell (PMM), known in 
France as Audit Continental with a staff of about 200 employees. 
The merged firm adopted the federative model of KMG rather 
than the centralized PMM model. This resulted in individual 
economic entities on a national level with a common name and 
methodology. The brand KPMG Audit was created, employing 
approximately 450 professionals in Paris. In 1988, KPMG Fidu-
ciaire de France became KPMG S.A. without participating in the 
capital of the international network but contributing to an inter-
national budget. In conclusion, the development of Fiduciaire de 
France is the outcome of a quite specific strategy. It succeeded 
in developing from a local firm into an international one, even 
being part of one of the largest networks in the world. In March 
2005, one of the last remaining French firms, Salustro Reydel, 
decided to join the KPMG network.
The Anglo-American audit firms developed a recruitment 
strategy that was significantly different from the recruitment 
policy of traditional French firms. It turned out to be a major 
innovation that supported the growth of the international firms. 
French firms mainly recruited staff holding degrees from voca-
tional institutions. From the end of the 1960s onwards, the inter-
national firms started hiring high-quality staff generally holding 
degrees from the Grandes Ecoles management schools. This has 
to be seen in the wider context following World War II referred 
to above. The creation of business education along U.S. models 
was considered essential to structurally embed the U.S, business 
model. American institutions and organizations encouraged 
the development of training programs around management-
related issues. Schools like HEC and ESSEC in Paris played an 
important role in the diffusion of new management approaches 
[Djelic, 1998, p. 211]. Graduates of these schools were strongly 
attracted to international accounting firms. The teaching staff of 
the Grandes Ecoles strongly supported MBA and CPA qualifica-
tions, which were found in large numbers in the large Anglo-
American audit firms. Ambitious graduates were attracted by the 
high salaries that these firms were willing to offer new recruits. 
These salaries were systematically higher than those paid by 
French firms and were complemented with permanent, system-
atic training and an exposure to business experience that was 
well beyond mere bookkeeping. This recruitment policy resulted 
in an inflow of staff capable of obtaining quickly both the French 
expert-comptable qualification and an expertise in English. The 
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auditors of Price Waterhouse, who prepared consolidated finan-
cial statements for Saint Gobain for the first time in 1976, had 
to study Anglo-American textbooks because consolidation tech-
niques were not part of the accounting curriculum and very few 
books on the subject existed in French. Another consequence 
was that staff members who left the profession quickly became 
senior executives in industry and frequently called on their for-
mer employer for its services. “All those who have left us, have 
fed the practice,” according to a former Andersen partner. Fi-
nally, and even more fundamentally, this recruitment policy also 
resulted in a rapid “Frenchization” of the big firms. From the 
end of the 1970s onwards, the partners of the Anglo-American 
audit firms in France were mainly French citizens born between 
1945 and 1950. Almost all the employees of these firms were 
French, with degrees from the French higher education system, 
and for the older ones, an expertise comptable degree. Originally, 
professional bodies, the state, or French society isolated the 
international firms because of their culture, their nationality, 
and/or their foreign origins. The growing dominance of French 
professionals in these firms made it impossible for these market 
players to continue to marginalize the international firms and 
made it possible for the international accounting firms to wage a 
wide-scale commercial battle in the 1980s under very favorable 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION
The introduction of the large Anglo-American audit firms 
into the French audit market was a complex process. Today, 
these international firms dominate the market, and only a few 
large French firms, such as Mazars, still maintain strong posi-
tions. The strategies of the international firms followed a pattern 
that can be framed within the literature on the internationaliza-
tion of service industries. Using the entry-mode classification 
of Anderson and Gatignon [1986], their original entry strategy 
was a “high-control” strategy, focusing on using expatriate staff 
involved in auditing subsidiaries of foreign clients of the Anglo-
American firms. A specific audit report for the French market 
was irrelevant in this context. However, this policy significantly 
limited the growth potential of the Anglo-American audit firms 
in France. To become larger, they had to expand their activities 
to French clients as well. In most cases, they chose an external-
growth strategy by taking over French audit firms or entering 
into alliances with local partners. This reduced direct control 
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over their activities in France, but it was compensated by licens-
ing the use of brand names, common approaches, etc. 
Hiring French professionals had two advantages that turned 
out to be essential to the success of the Anglo-American firms. 
First, from an institutional perspective, their “Frenchization” 
can be seen as conforming to the roles and norms of French 
society, making them more acceptable to the French establish-
ment and making it much more difficult for traditional French 
accounting bodies to protect the market for audit services. Yiu 
and Makino [2002] argue that foreign entrants face significant 
pressure to conform to local standards in this way, in line with 
Kipping [1999], who underlined the importance of establishing 
successful external and internal local networks to expand U.S. 
consulting companies in Western Europe. We go further and 
state that the “Frenchization” of the international firms was 
a key success factor for them. Second, the educational back-
ground of these French professionals made it possible for the 
Anglo-American firms to profile their services as being of signifi-
cantly higher quality than the local standard. Consequently, they 
became similar to the French service providers, but they could 
also maintain an image of higher-quality service providers. 
Agarwal and Ramaswami [1992] considered superiority of assets 
and skills as a precondition to compete successfully with local 
service providers. Indeed, the superiority of their assets, their 
larger size, and their differentiated products both within and 
around the audit industry made it difficult for the local firms to 
compete and explains why they became dominant despite their 
wide institutional distance.
The international audit firms strongly influenced the way 
audits are carried out in France. Their methodology was trans-
ferred to French audit firms by auditors trained in the large 
international firms but continuing their careers in local firms. 
This strengthened large local firms, which could start compet-
ing with the international firms to gain large clients. These local 
firms were helped by the French system of co-commissariat joint 
audit [Piot, 2001]. However, it is doubtful whether these large 
French firms will continue to play an important role for much 
longer. The recent integration of Salustro-Reydel, one of the 
two largest French audit firms, into KPMG illustrates this trend. 
Increased competition in the market of larger clients also led to 
recent attempts to increase the market share of the international 
audit firms in the market of small and medium-sized clients, 
eventually affecting the whole audit market structure. The tra-
ditional audit markets became saturated as both international 
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and local firms expanded into new types of assurance services 
and into new markets. This development was interrupted in the 
post-Enron era when the corporate scandals that shocked the fi-
nancial markets at the start of the 21st century shifted the focus 
back to conflicts of interest and auditor independence. On the 
European level, some basic rules of the game were rewritten in 
the new Eighth Directive, and France introduced a new supervi-
sory structure and regulation of the financial markets. To a large 
extent, these changes are taking place now, but their effects will 
only be seen in the future. It will be interesting to observe how 
professional structures will reflect these changes and whether 
they will lead to the renewal of a debate that was essential in 
shaping the French profession a quarter century ago. 
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APPENDIX A
List of the Ten Interviewees
Interviewee 1 former member of the Conseil Supérieur de l’Ordre 
des Experts- Comptables; former president of the 
Commission des Diligences Normales of the OEC; 
created a small firm that became one of the largest 
independent French audit firms
Interviewee 2 former president of the Conseil Supérieur de l’Ordre 
des Experts- Comptables; former partner in a small 
audit firm
Interviewee 3 former general secretary of the CNCC; moved from 
a large Anglo-American firm to create his own 
small firm
Interviewee 4 former general secretary of the CNCC
Interviewee 5 former president of the CNCC; former partner in a 
mid-sized French firm 
Interviewee 6 former president of the CNCC; former partner in a 
small French firm
Interviewee 7 responsible for accounting resources at the COB 
(AMF) 
Interviewee 8 partner of an Anglo-American audit firm
Interviewee 9 partner of an Anglo-American audit firm
Interviewee 10 university professor
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